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Social Democratic parties as buffers against the extreme right: the case of
Belgium
Hilde Coffe´
University of Utrecht, The Netherlands
While the Vlaams Blok (currently Vlaams Belang) became one of the most successful and
electorally durable extreme-right parties in Europe in the 1990s, the francophone Front
National has yet to achieve a stable basis of support. We argue that an important reason for
this divergence has been the behaviour of Social Democratic parties in the two regions of
Belgium. In Wallonia, the Parti Socialiste (PS) held onto its traditional electorate through
both distributing material beneﬁts and by keeping traditional economic themes, or issues
that it ‘owns’, high on the political agenda. The SP (currently SP.A) in Flanders has done
less well on both counts. Since Social Democratic parties across Western Europe have lost
voters to the extreme right, our comparison suggests that their behaviour is an important
variable in understanding cross-national variation in the extreme-right’s success.
Keywords: extreme-right parties; Social Democratic parties; clientelism; issue salience;
Belgium
In recent years, the literature on extreme-right parties has turned to the important question of
why such parties have been electorally successful in some states and not in others. Following
Kitschelt’s (1995) seminal work on this subject, a number of scholars have engaged in cross-
national quantitative comparisons (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Lubbers et al. 2002, Golder
2003, Carter 2005, Norris 2005, Van der Brug et al. 2005), while others have offered analyses
of particular cases (Ignazi 2003, Rydgren 2004, Givens 2005, Art 2006). One potentially illumi-
nating comparison that has received surprisingly little attention – Hossay’s (2002) chapter ‘Why
Flanders?’ being a notable exception – however, is that between the two regions of Belgium:
Dutch-speaking Flanders in the north and French-speaking Wallonia in the south. Since
Belgium lacks a national party system, it is possible to treat these regions as separate cases,
and the divergence of the extreme right in the two cases is striking. Whereas the Vlaams
Belang (VB – previously Vlaams Blok) gained 19% in the 2007 parliamentary federal elections
in the Flemish region, the Front National (FN) received only 5.6% inWallonia. Over the last two
decades, the VB has consistently outperformed its French-speaking counterpart (see Table 1).
What causes the strength of the extreme right in Flanders and its relative weakness in
Wallonia? Since federal electoral rules do not differ across the two cases, these can be ruled
out as possible explanations. Aside from the obvious difference in the desire for autonomy in
the two regions, the single largest difference between Flanders and Wallonia is socio-economic.
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In short, Flanders possesses a vibrant economy with a relatively low level of unemployment
while Wallonia has yet to recover from industrial decline. Scholars who ﬁnd a positive relation-
ship between unemployment and electoral support for the extreme right (Jackman and Volpert
1996) would thus have trouble explaining the Belgian cases. However, if one posits a negative
relationship between these variables (Knigge 1998, Lubbers et al. 2002), the success of the VB
and the relative weakness of the FN make more sense.
The issue then becomes how socio-economic conditions are translated into political out-
comes. Hence, we join a growing number of scholars who, following a distinction made by
Norris (2005) among others, focus on the supply side of extreme-right voting rather than on the
demand side. Our argument in this article also builds on a growing body of scholarship that
locates the interaction between extreme-right parties and mainstream ones as a critical variable
in the formers’ success or failure (Bale 2003, Givens 2005, Meguid 2005, Art 2007). Divergent
from most previous studies, however, is our focus on the pivotal role of Social Democratic
parties. As noted below, Social Democratic parties across Europe have lost voters to the
extreme right, and the situation is no different inBelgium.Yetwe argue that the Social Democratic
party in Wallonia, the Parti Socialiste (PS), has done a much better job than its Flemish counter-
part, the SP.A (previously SP), in limiting its losses, for two reasons. Firstly, the PS’s clientelism
and its penetration of Wallonian society helped it to ensure loyalty during the 1990s, even in the
wake of persistent economic decline under its stewardship. Secondly, the PS hasmanaged to keep
the electorate’s concern focused on economic issues. Since extreme-right parties have historically
campaigned on cultural issues such as anti-immigration and law and order, or the polar opposite of
those issues important to Green parties, our study suggests – in line with theories of issue own-
ership – that Social Democratic parties that stick to their traditional economic issues have a
better chance of holding off the extreme right than those that seek to modernize their message.
The following section outlines the origins and development of the VB and the FN, noting
the contextual variables that are similar and different in Flanders and Wallonia. The second
section then documents the shift of working-class voters from Social Democracy to the
extreme right across Western Europe to ground our discussion of Belgium in a broader compara-
tive perspective. We then develop the two parts of our explanation for the divergent outcomes of
the VB and the FN during the 1990s, focusing on clientelism and issue ownership. Since we
believe that the salience of economic themes is due not only to the PS’s own strategy, we
also analyse how the broader political environment in which Social Democrats exist inﬂuences
Table 1. Results obtained by the extreme-right parties in the federal
parliament elections










Note: As Belgium has a confederal party model, we give the electoral
results per region. National parties no longer exist and, except in the
complex situation in Brussels, a Flemish citizen cannot vote for a
French-speaking politician, or vice versa.






































their ability to keep high salience of such themes. Finally, we describe the inﬂuence of the
extreme parties on the political competition and salience of different policy issues. We draw
on a variety of secondary survey data and studies which have been conducted during the
1990s, as well as interviews conducted by the author in relation to broader research on the
extreme right in Belgium, for our evidentiary base. The last section concludes, notes several
other possible explanations for our initial puzzle, and suggests some directions for future
cross-national research.
The extreme right in Belgium
The VB is an amalgamation of two right-wing nationalist parties and participated in elections for
the ﬁrst time in 1978. In its ﬁrst few years, the VB strove for the independence of Flanders and
remained a small splinter party, recruiting its members from the ranks of activists in Flemish
nationalist organizations with which it was in close contact. Its fortunes changed dramatically
in the late 1980s, however, after resistance to immigration became the party’s core issue. The
VB conducted a ﬁerce anti-immigrant campaign in the 1987 parliamentary elections, doubling
its number of seats in parliament – from one to two – and winning for the ﬁrst time in its history
a seat in the Belgian Senate under the slogan Eigen volk eerst! (Our own people ﬁrst!). The
party’s real breakthrough came in the parliamentary elections of 24 November 1991 – a day
that was afterwards labelled as ‘Black Sunday’ – when it obtained 10.3% of Flemish votes.
The VB continued to grow throughout the following decade. In the most recent elections (the
federal elections of June 2007), the party reaped 19% of the vote in the Flemish region.
However, despite being an important player in the Flemish political landscape, the party was
never allowed to participate in government because of an agreement among all other political
parties not to cooperate with it (the so-called cordon sanitaire). In November 2004, the party
was convicted of racism and banned, but the organization merely regrouped under the new
name Vlaams Belang (Coffe´ 2005b, Erk 2005).
Following the example of the Front National of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Daniel Fe´ret
founded the FN in Belgium in 1985. From the few documents that are available from the 1985
elections, it is clear that immigration was its central issue (Delwit and De Waele 1999), and this
remains true today. Unlike the VB and despite its support for the principle of national sover-
eignty based on a redeﬁnition of national identity, the FN does not seek greater autonomy for
Wallonia, but rather is in favour of the Belgian state.
In 1991, the party for the ﬁrst time submitted lists of candidates in every Wallonian
province. With 5.5% of the overall Wallonian vote, the party made deﬁnite progress in 1995
and appeared to have achieved a modest electoral breakthrough. After a decrease in the 1999
elections, it won 5.6% of Wallonian votes in 2003 when, for the ﬁrst time in its history, the
party could send delegates to the two federal chambers. This meant that it was entitled to
federal funding. But since an FN member of the Senate left the party, this funding has now
been cut. Furthermore, a split within the party has recently resulted in a lack of clarity about
the actual representative of the FN. Two groups are indeed claiming that they form the party
Front National.
As Table 1 demonstrates, the VB has consistently outperformed the FN. Possible reasons for
these divergent trajectories have been suggested previously. One plausible hypothesis is that the
success of the VB is directly related to its support for Flemish separatism. Yet while there is no
doubt that the members and the chief leaders of the VB care deeply about this issue, the same
cannot be said for the party’s voters. Electoral surveys show that separatist motives are important
for only a small percentage of the VB’s electorate. In 1999, only 4% of the VB’s electorate men-






































who mentioned immigration (Van Craen and Swyngedouw 2002). There is no comparable
nationalist movement in Wallonia, largely because the French-speaking minority has histori-
cally strongly supported the Belgian state – a nationalism that does not have any organizational
structure – and the FN has not mobilized around the issue of nationalism.
A second possibility is that differences in immigration between the two regions explain the
divergent trajectories of the extreme right. Many scholars have argued that high levels of immi-
gration increase support for extreme-right parties (Knigge 1998, Lubbers et al. 2000, Gibson
2002), although there is currently a scholarly debate over how much immigration matters and
under what conditions (Golder 2003, Norris 2005). Yet the fact that Wallonia possesses
nearly twice the number of foreigners as Flanders should cast considerable doubt about the
importance of this variable for our case. Moreover, the percentage of Turks and people from
Maghreb countries – the population groups that are particularly targeted in the extreme-
right’s propaganda as the scapegoat for a whole range of social problems and whose presence
has been shown to have a highly signiﬁcant and positive impact on extreme-right vote share
(Coffe´ et al. 2007) – is the same in both regions.
A third possibility is that Wallonians are simply more tolerant of immigrants than the
Flemish. Yet previous work shows that the regional difference in electoral results cannot be
explained by differences in voters’ attitudes (Coffe´ 2005a). Attitudes that are typical of the
extreme-right electorate such as intolerance towards immigrants, political powerlessness and
authoritarianism, are more widespread in Wallonia than in Flanders.
As noted above, the largest difference between Flanders and Wallonia is socio-economic.
The socio-economic performance is much worse in Wallonia than in Flanders, and Wallonia
has a high level of unemployment. Wallonia, the ﬁrst industrialized region of the Continent,
declined in economic terms after the Second World War, while the post-war industrialization
of Flanders was based successfully on small and medium-sized enterprises and multinationals
(Dewinter 2005). Hence, by the 1960s Flanders was in full expansion, while the Wallonian
economy was in decline. Since then, Flanders has always been the wealthier region.
In short, considering the explanatory variables proposed in the literature, the different econ-
omic situation in the two Belgian regions seems an important factor for explaining the regional
difference. Yet since there is disagreement on the link between (general) economic conditions as
determinants of the electoral success of the extreme right, we assume that it is not so much the
socio-economic environment that explains the salience of the issues but, following Schain et al.
(2002), how different issues are translated into political terms by parties.
From social democracy to the extreme right
The post-industrial development of Western societies has led to the decline of economic-related
cleavages and the rise of non-material conﬂicts. The latter include both left-libertarian issues
such as the environment and right-authoritarian demands such as a strict migration policy and
a hierarchical state. These right-authoritarian attitudes are characteristic of the so-called
‘losers’ in post-industrial societies. They are unable to cope with the acceleration of economic,
social and cultural modernization and/or are stuck in full or partial unemployment, and run the
risk of falling into the new underclass (Betz 1994). Hence, they can be supposed to have insecure
and resentful sentiments that may be canalized into support for policy proposals that stress the
need to return to more traditional value-proposals that are typical of extreme-right parties.
Kitschelt (1995) also refers to the social groups experiencing deprivation of life chances that
has arisen as a result of the transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial economy.
These groups were previously closely connected to the Social Democrats. The proﬁle of the






































voters is indeed very similar to the proﬁle of the socialist voter (Lubbers et al. 2002). Although
one must be careful in equating extreme-right voters with the so-called losers of modernization
(Norris 2005), the overlap between the two groups does appear to be substantial. Ignazi (2003)
writes of ‘the massive presence of working-class people in the extreme-right electorate’, and
surveys in different countries have indicated that working-class and former socialist voters
have found their way to extreme-right parties (Luther 2003, Knapp 2004, Ivarsﬂaten 2005,
McGann and Kitschelt 2005). A few examples from Western Europe help place the Belgian
case in comparative context. The term gaucho-lepe´nisme (Perrineau 1997) refers to the fact
that a signiﬁcant percentage of FN voters migrated from the left of the political spectrum. In
Scandinavia, the Danish People’s Party currently has the highest percentage of workers,
while the Norwegian Progress Party is the only party in which unskilled workers are overrepre-
sented (Bjørklund and Andersen 2007). In 1999, the Austrian FPO¨ captured 47% of the working-
class vote, far outpacing the Social Democrats, which claimed only 35% (Art 2006). Markovits
(2002) concluded before the FPO¨’s implosion in 2002 that sociologically speaking, the party
under Haider has assumed the proﬁle of a traditional party of the Old Left.
In short, Social Democratic parties and extreme-right parties appear to be competing for
many of the same voters. When the VB broke through in 1991, the Dutch-speaking Social
Democratic Party was the main provider of voters for the VB: almost 19% of the VB’s electorate
was taken from the SP. Also, more than 14% of socialist labour union members voted in 1991 for
the VB. Hence, the VB claimed to be the largest ‘labour party’ in Flanders.
Social Democratic parties are certainly not the only ones losing votes to the extreme right, in
Belgium or elsewhere. The Belgian electoral survey (ISPO/PIOP), shows that 16% of the VB vote
at the 1991 elections came from the Christian Democrats (CVP – currently CD&V), while 12%
came from the Liberals (PVV – currently Open VLD). Hence, it should be clear that Social Demo-
cratic parties are not the only ‘buffer’ against the extreme right. Indeed, inmany (spatial) analyses it
is the party to their immediate right that is viewed as the extreme right’s primary competitor
(Meguid 2005). However, given the similarities between the extreme right and the traditional
socialist electorate, the relative lack of attention in the scholarly literature to the relationship
between Social Democrats and the extreme right, and the importance of the Social Democratic
parties in our case studies, we feel justiﬁed in focusing our attention on them.
The transition to a post-industrial society has posed a major challenge to traditional Social
Democratic parties. As Kitschelt (1994) indicates, not only do they have to decide on how to
handle new leftist issues and parties but they also have to handle the attractiveness of
extreme-right parties to their electorate, as Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen (2004) point out.
They argue that the main problem for Social Democracy in Scandinavia is not the existence
of new parties on their left ﬂank but rather the fact that some issues on the political agenda
may cause voters to support extreme-right parties. Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen
(2002) demonstrate for the Dutch and Danish cases that one of the main challenges for Social
Democrats derives from the strong politicization of questions relating to refugees and
asylum-seekers. Social Democratic parties thus struggle to prevent new political issues from
becoming important, and to keep the political agenda dominated by traditional political
issues, such as (un)employment and social welfare.
We explore this concept of issue ownership below. But ﬁrst we consider a more structural
explanation for the ability of Social Democratic parties to hold onto their traditional electorate.
In short, we argue that the PS in Wallonia, in contrast to most Social Democratic parties in
Western Europe, has remained strong because it has preserved its traditional social linkages.
Similar to the Bavarian CSU, the PS in Wallonia penetrates Wallonian society to a large
extent. In Flanders, however, the SP.A has far less contact with its traditional clientele.






































subcultures has unravelled more in Flanders than in Wallonia, and the erosion of a distinct
working-class pillar is part of this phenomenon (Smits 1995).
Clientelism and pillarization of the Social Democratic parties
Between 1945 and the most recent federal elections of 2007 – when the Liberals of the MR
became the largest political French-speaking party formation – the PS has been the largest fran-
cophone political party. The PS is the central pillar of a network of organizations and maintains
strong links to a number of important auxiliary associations in health and education policy
(Maesschalck and Van de Walle 2007). The PS is a typical example of a so-called mass party
(Duverger 1969) and the most ‘pillarized’ Belgian party. Billiet (2006) indeed concludes that
whereas the impact of pillarization on voting behaviour is diminishing, the socialist pillar in
Wallonia remains ﬁrm. Data from the 1991 Belgian general election survey (see Table 2)
show that over 70% of the members of the socialist labour union voted for the PS. In Flanders,
the SP could rely on only 57% of the socialist labour union members. Even though the percen-
tage of labour union members voting for the PS declined during the 1990s, the ﬁgures still show
a difference of more than 8% by the end of that decade. The PS also takes the ideas of the trade
union into account when deciding on its economic and social programme, thus making it a real
labour force or travaillist party. It is also important to note that only 28% of the largest labour
union in Flanders, the Christian labour union, voted in 1999 for the political party (the Christian
Democrats) with which they are afﬁliated. There is thus a much larger reservoir of ‘ﬂoating’
labour union members in Flanders than in Wallonia.
The Wallonian PS has always used a socialism of proximity: it is near its electorate
(Demelenne 2005). Elio Di Rupo, current president of the PS, claims that the connection of
the party with its voters is the party’s most important strength (Coffe´ 2005b). The party’s social-
ism of proximity has also been associated with clientelistic practices, offering party members
jobs in state enterprises and treating them favourably in the attribution of public services and
utilities (interviews with Guido Fonteyn and Olivier Mouton; Fonteyn 2002, Demelenne
2005). Indeed, given its strong position at the local level, the party has close contacts with
the municipal (utility) companies. In addition, party-afﬁliated organizations administer public
services (health care, public-sector jobs, unemployment beneﬁts), which makes it possible for
the party to distribute material beneﬁts.
Table 2. Percentages of labour union members voting for their pillar party
1991 1995 1999
Pillar party N Pillar party N Pillar party N
Flanders
Socialist Labour Union 57.0 505 53.5 172 42.1 273
Christian Labour Union 35.6 263 34.7 291 28.0 457
Liberal Labour Union 50.8 61 54.0 50 60.3 68
Wallonia
Socialist Labour Union 71.5 200 60.9 156 50.5 186
Christian Labour Union 33.9 118 30.4 92 21.8 124
Liberal Labour Union 53.3 15 63.6 11 50.0 12
Sign.   
Note: The number of respondents (N) is shown in italics.
 P  0.01.






































A survey by the Departments of Political Science of the VUB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
and UCL (Universite´ Catholique de Louvain) of Flemish andWallonian local party leaders orga-
nized in relation to the Belgian 2000 municipal elections indeed shows that the PS is the party
that provides the most ‘services’ to its constituents. Party leaders were allowed to interpret the
meaning of ‘services’ themselves, but it could mean anything from arranging a building permit
to providing a job in the public sector. It thus falls under the broad rubric of clientelism. As
Table 3 indicates, 60% of PS party leaders claimed to have provided some sort of service
over the past 12 months. The corresponding ﬁgure for SP party leaders in Flanders was only
about 50%. In addition to providing services, party leaders were also asked whether they had
organized an event, such as a public debate, movie, ball, or dinner party, for their constituents
over the last 12 months. The PS beats the SP in every category except movies. Across the board,
one can see that Wallonian party leaders report that they have organized more events for the
electorate than their counterparts in Flanders. This emerging picture of an active Socialist
Party in Wallonia is conﬁrmed by the results of the Belgian general election surveys conducted
in the 1990s (ISPO/PIOP) (see Table 4). Voters were asked whether they had contacted a poli-
tician within the last 12 months. In 1999, nearly 22% of PS voters answered this question in the
afﬁrmative, while only 13% of SP voters in Flanders did so. If we consider all of the above data
as an indicator of the proximity of the party to the electorate, it is clear that the PS was in closer
contact with its electorate than the SP in the 1990s.
Although the ﬁgures presented above indicate a declining trend in the pillarization of the PS
and its closeness to the electorate, and although the percentage differences between the two
Social Democratic parties are not always dramatic, every proxy conﬁrms the hypothesis of a
stronger pillarization and relation between the electorate and the party in Wallonia (Coffe´ and
Stouthuysen 2006). This strongly suggests that, in line with conventional wisdom, Social
Democratic parties have been better able to hold onto their traditional bases of support during
the 1990s in Wallonia than in Flanders. Yet apart from distributing favours and organizing
dinner parties, why else would voters in Wallonia continue to support the PS? Certainly,
policy issues play a role as well.
Table 3. Organization of selected party activities in the previous 12 months (percentages)
Services Political debate Movie Ball Dinner party N
Flanders
Agalev 4.3 49.3 0.7 4.3 31.2 138
SP 50.4 55.2 15.2 24.0 58.4 125
VLD 46.3 47.8 1.5 33.6 61.9 134
VB 13.8 37.9 8.6 6.9 46.6 58
VU&ID 17.8 46.6 2.7 8.2 58.9 73
CVP 23.3 58.7 0.7 22.0 53.3 150
Wallonia
PS 60.0 62.2 14.4 41.1 62.2 90
Ecolo 2.5 79.0 12.6 4.2 42.9 119
PSC 42.9 55.2 5.7 15.2 66.7 105
PRL/FDF 42.9 60.5 8.4 28.6 72.3 119
Sign.     
Notes: Data were not available for the FN.
The number of respondents (N) is shown in italics.
 P  0.01.






































Issue ownership and the salience of policy issues
According to Budge and Farlie (1983), parties try to shift public attention to topics for which
they feel they have a good reputation or that they ‘own’. Parties can thus gain electoral
support by increasing the salience of each of their issues during a campaign, giving them
good reason to consistently emphasize ‘their’ topics. A good reputation regarding these issues
results from a history of attention, initiative and innovation towards these issues and leads
voters to believe that the party’s candidates are more sincere and committed to doing something
about them (Petrocik 1996). In recent years, several studies have provided strong empirical
evidence that issue ownership is an important dimension of electoral campaigns (Sellers
1998, Petrocik et al. 2003, Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen 2004, Holian 2004). This research
shows that parties tend to strategically emphasize issues on which they are perceived to be
more competent and that the election outcomes reﬂect, in good part, the relative salience of
the various parties’ ‘owned’ issues.
These ﬁndings thus imply that Social Democratic parties will beneﬁt when issues relating to
the socio-economic dimension have a high salience in politics. The extreme-right parties, on the
other hand, will try to give ‘their’ issues such as immigration and law and order a more promi-
nent position on the political agenda (Ivarsﬂaten 2005, Rydgren 2005). If they succeed in doing
so, they will render the beneﬁts of owning the welfare state issue less important, which is poten-
tially threatening to Social Democratic parties. Kriesi (1999) demonstrates that the relative
strength of the traditional cleavages restricts the possibilities of the mobilization based on the
new cleavages. A lack of salience of the traditional cleavages, on the other hand, makes the
losers of the modernization process generally available for appeals by the extreme right.
Givens (2005) shows how traditional cleavages appear to have a stronger inﬂuence in
Germany where the extreme right has been relatively unsuccessful than in France or Austria
where the FN and the FPO¨, respectively, have been electorally successful.
Taking these theories as a starting point, we hypothesize that the PS has been able to control
the political agenda and preserve the traditional left-ideological dimension in domestic politics,
Table 4. Percentages of voters having contacted a politician personally in the previous 12 months
1991 1995 1999
% N % N % N
Flanders
Agalev 12.5 183 5.6 125 7.5 240
SP 20.7 455 18.7 359 13.1 327
VLD 24.7 450 17.7 373 9.3 492
VB 10.3 242 17.4 218 8.9 336
VU&ID 14.2 219 13.6 132 10.4 192
CVP 17.9 632 16.6 487 11.1 487
Wallonia
PS 32.3 455 26.9 323 21.9 283
Ecolo 11.9 160 15.8 95 17.3 179
PSC 31.8 261 25.6 211 17.7 164
PRL/FDF 25.5 231 21.5 228 18.7 246
FN 36.0 25 25.5 47 19.2 52
Sign.   
Note: The number of respondents (N) is shown in italics.
 P  0.01






































whereas the SP has failed to do so. In other words, we expect that issues other than those
pertaining to traditional class-based politics have attracted Flemish voters’ attention, which
led to the continuing growth of the extreme right in the northern region during the 1990s.
The results based on data from the 1991 and 1999 Belgian general election surveys (ISPO/
PIOP) presented in Table 5 conﬁrm our hypothesis. In these studies, respondents were asked to
indicate their main concerns when making their party choice. Whereas 56.6% of the Wallonian
voters mentioned ‘(un)employment’ when asked which problems they considered to be import-
ant when deciding how to vote, only 38.4% of the Flemish voters did so. On the other hand,
25.1% and 34.6% of the Flemish voters and only 12.3% and 29.2% of the Wallonian ones con-
sidered migration and law and order as salient issues, respectively. Hence, we can conclude that
while in Flanders cultural issues have gained a high position on the political agenda, Wallonian
politics continued to be dominated by issues relating to the welfare system. For sure, the fran-
cophone Social Democrats have also lost voters on account of new political issues such as the
environment, but these issues have not been able to add a dimension to the domestic political
debate that threatens the traditional left/right divide. Table 5 shows that the issue of the environ-
ment is far less important for Wallonian voters than the topic of (un)employment. Then how can
the success of the francophone greens of Ecolo – which Bomberg (1998) considers as one of the
electorally most successful green parties in Europe – during the 1990s be explained? One would
expect that when a green party is successful, issues ‘owned’ by the greens (such as the environ-
mental issue) would be salient. Research, however, revealed that (part of) Ecolo’s success could
be explained by its attraction of protest voters (Frognier 1994). These voters did not vote
in favour of Ecolo, but against the mainstream parties. Ecolo fulﬁlled the function of an anti-
establishment party and feelings of political powerlessness were omnipresent within the
party’s electorate.
The importance of traditional issues for the electorate is in line with ﬁndings from surveys
of local party leaders. Table 6 shows that the francophone party leaders, and local leaders of the
PS in particular, are generally more concerned with traditional themes such as social affairs and
employment than Dutch-speaking party leaders. For example, more than 75% of the local party
leaders of the PS considered traditional left/right issues such as social affairs and employment as
very important policy themes. Of the local leaders of the SP, only 69% and 45%, respectively,
considered social affairs and employment as important issues.
Table 5. Percentages of policy themes considered important when deciding how to vote
1991 1999
Flanders Wallonia Sign. Flanders Wallonia Sign.
(Un)employment 36.1 43.6  38.3 25.1 
Migration 31.4 21.7  56.6 12.3 
Environment 39.6 34.2  28.9 23.7 
N 2385 1388 2501 1341
Notes: In 1991 the respondents were asked to indicate ﬁve policy issues that they consider as being import-
ant from a list of 27 issues. In 1999, the respondents were asked to indicate only four issues in a list of 24.
Hence, the percentages – which refer to the percentages of respondents who indicated the respective item –
are not comparable between both years of survey. Unfortunately, the policy issues included in the 1995
election survey were different from the 1991 and 1999 election surveys.
The number of respondents (N) is shown in italics.
 P  0.01.






































These ﬁndings demonstrate the relevance of issue ownership theories and lend support to
our argument that Social Democratic parties tend to do best if traditional political issues
dominate political debates. In Flanders, the traditional economic debate has clearly eroded,
undermining electoral support for the Social Democratic Party. For the extreme-right party on
the other hand, this decline in importance of the traditional economic debate and the growing
salience of the migration issue offered favourable conditions to attract voters. In their examin-
ation of issues in the 2002 French presidential election, Mayer and Tiberj (2004) also provide
evidence to suggest that, while by 1995 most French voters already considered Le Pen’s
Front National as the party best able to address crime, this factor probably bolstered the
party’s share of the vote in 2002 because the issue of insecurity suddenly became highly salient.
Given that parties select strategies in an interactive environment, it could be argued that the
strategic choice of the francophone Social Democrats’ competitors has shaped a political agenda
in which traditional and social issues take a central place. Furthermore, the dominant position of
the PS in Wallonia may have created a ‘power legacy’ that helps to preserve the traditional
distinction between ‘left’ and ‘right’ in Wallonian politics and thereby structures the choices
of its competitors which beneﬁt the Social Democrats.
The political competition and the salience of policy issues
The Social Democratic parties do not operate in a political vacuum, and their behaviour and
policy choices are inﬂuenced by the attitudes and choices of the other mainstream parties.
Deschouwer (2004) argues that in the francophone part of Belgium, the policy ideas advocated
by the Liberal (MR – previously PRL) and Christian Democratic (CDH – previously PSC)
parties are to a signiﬁcant degree determined by the overriding goal of standing united
against their common enemy, the Social Democratic Party. This ﬁxation on becoming larger
to better attack the PS paradoxically appears to have beneﬁted the PS. For one thing, it tends
to preserve a political agenda dominated by the traditional distinction between ‘left’
and ‘right’ and class-based loyalties. Secondly, the preservation of so-called bloc politics in
Wallonia seems to mean that discontented Social Democratic voters have preferred to turn to
Table 6. Percentages of policy themes considered very important
Social affairs Employment N
Flanders
Agalev 54.0 17.0 135
CVP 43.2 24.3 146
SP 69.1 45.1 122
VB 50.9 40.4 55
VLD 35.1 50.0 130
VU 45.7 25.4 70
Other Dutch-speaking parties 50.0 31.8 22
Wallonia
Ecolo 69.5 46.0 115
PS 76.4 75.9 89
PSC 51.0 48.5 102
PRL 53.1 57.0 113
FDF 50.0 16.7 6
Other French-speaking parties 51.5 58.8 34
Sign.  
Note: The number of respondents (N) is shown in italics.






































the leftist party rather than, as has happened in Flanders, cross over the bloc line and support a
populist right-wing party. The Belgian general election surveys (ISPO/PIOP) indicated that
whereas a signiﬁcant part of the SP electorate moved to the VB during the 1990s, the PS lost
most votes to the Green Party. Of the 1995 PS electorate, for example, 11% voted for Ecolo
in 1999, whereas only 3% voted for the extreme-right Front National.
Regarding the left/right cleavage in the political ﬁeld, Kitschelt (1995) hypothesizes that a
convergence between the moderate right and moderate left is a good environment for the emer-
gence of right-wing populist parties. In instances of such a convergence, the parties of the
extreme right are more likely to play the anti-establishment card. They argue that if voters
wish to see a real alternative to both the government and the mainstream opposition, they
should put their support behind the right-wing extremist party. By contrast, when the mainstream
parties are ideologically distinct from each other, it is more difﬁcult for the extreme-right parties
to adopt this populist strategy.
Figures 1 and 2, which draw on the data and analysis of the Comparative Manifesto Project
(Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2006), demonstrate how the traditional pillar parties con-
verged. The Social Democrats, but particularly the Liberals, moved to the centre. Although this
process of convergence has taken place in both Flanders and Wallonia, the process is more strik-
ing for the Dutch-speaking parties where the Liberal Party (PVV – renamed VLD in 1992 and
currently named Open VLD) changed its economic programme from outspoken right in the
beginning of the 1980s to a centre-oriented programme in the beginning of the 1990s. Since
the VLD entered government in 1999, it has continued trying to expand its electoral base by
orienting itself towards the centre of the political space, a centre position traditionally defended
by Christian Democracy (CVP – currently CD&V). Indeed, it should be noted that the Christian
Democratic Party, presenting itself as an ideological centre party, has been dominating Flanders
for several decades. Consequently, the traditional economic left/right division has always been
weaker and less important in Flanders than in Wallonia (Deschouwer 2003). Also, although the
ideological position of the SP and the PS was similar in 1991, this position near the centre of the
left–right divide did not lead to an electoral loss in favour of the extreme right for the PS,
whereas it did for the SP. Two reasons can be proposed to explain this divergence. Firstly, in
Flanders all parties held approximately the same position, whereas a difference between the tra-
ditional left and right in Wallonia was stronger. This is likely to have alienated more socialist
Figure 1. Evolution of the traditional Dutch-speaking parties on the left/right scale.






































voters in Flanders than Wallonia. Secondly, the move towards the left/right position in 1991 of
both the Liberals and the Social Democrats was stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia, given
their more rightist and leftist position, respectively, in 1987 in Flanders than in Wallonia.
This may indicate that it is, as the hypothesis suggests, particularly the convergence between
left and right that is important when explaining the success of the extreme right.
Regarding the convergence of the traditional left and right parties, it is also important to
note that the Flemish socialists revised their welfare policy in the 1990s into a Third Way orien-
tation and moved from an outspoken left position during the 1980s to the centre at the end of the
1990s. This Third Way direction also implied that economic and welfare policies became a more
consensual area, with limited party disagreement. Hence the welfare state became a so-called
valence issue, where there is agreement on goals in Flemish politics (Blomqvist and Green-
Pedersen 2004). As such, it receives less attention in political debates, thereby leaving more
space for other political issues. Moreover, the mainstream left and right party have governed
together since the 1999 elections, and even though such grand coalitions have been formed
both in Flanders and Wallonia, the PS clearly holds less of the discourse of an Active Welfare
State than the Dutch-speaking sister party did. Although it is governing together with the
Liberals, the PS consequently takes a strong leftist position and maintains a traditional socialist
discourse.
The inﬂuence of the extreme-right parties on the salience of policy issues
The salience of the traditional left/right dimension is certainly not determined only by the
strategy of the Social Democrats and their interaction with the other mainstream parties but
is also determined by the extreme-right parties themselves. In particular, in countries or
regions where the extreme right has become an important political player, it has an inﬂuence
on political competition and strategic choices of political parties. In Flanders, the VB has
clearly inﬂuenced the political arena and the political agenda with its populist discourse on
criminality and migration. Through its professional, large-scale and continuous campaigns,
it raised the salience of the issues of immigration and criminality. Besides, the party could
frame the migration issue in a campaign of Flemish nationalism that is more than a century
Figure 2. Evolution of the traditional French-speaking parties on the left/right scale.






































old (Hossay 2002). Indeed, the VB combined the anti-immigrant issue with Flemish
nationalism. The premise of Flemish nationalism is that a people or cultural group should
be able to exercise, as much as possible, sovereignty within the territory to which they have
historically been tied. The abiding presence or unchecked inﬂux of other groups triggers nega-
tive feelings, as the concern arises that this other group will also have cultural and political
ambitions (Jaspers 2003).
Studying the political parties’ 2003 election programmes, Van Aelst and Walgrave (2003)
conclude that the parties paid more attention to these issues in their campaigns than ever before.
As such, the VB achieved – as the party itself recognizes – one of its goals by making its pol-
itical programme the subject of political debate (Coffe´ 2005b). Erk (2005) concludes that the
Dutch-speaking parties have felt the necessity to incorporate aspects of the extreme-right
agenda and have endorsed the VB’s emphasis on law and order. As Rydgren (2004) argues
for the Danish case, the incorporation of extreme-right ideas had the effect of revealing for
the voters the indirect inﬂuence and power of the extreme-right party, as well as lending legiti-
macy to the extreme right.
Dutch-speaking mainstream parties (including the Social Democrats), have not only paid
more attention to issues that are central in the extreme-right’s discourse (such as criminality
and immigration) but, according to Lubbers’ (2001) expert survey, the parties have also taken
stricter positions regarding these issues since the electoral breakthrough of the VB. As Erk
(2005, p. 499) concludes: ‘the Vlaams Blok has managed to pull the political centre towards
the right in Flanders’. Hossay (2002) mentions the debate on voting rights for foreign residents
in which Flemish political leaders appeared signiﬁcantly less in favour of extending these rights
than their Wallonian counterparts. For the socialist Minister of Internal Affairs (Louis Tobback),
fear of the possible electoral consequences of the introduction of voting rights for immigrants
was a reason not to implement voting rights (Jacobs 1998). The Social Democrats felt particu-
larly threatened by the VB that would appeal to its voters by linking the presence of immigrants
to the increasing level of unemployment.
In general, and even though research on the inﬂuence of the extreme right on policy making
is still underdeveloped, it seems that extreme-right parties have an impact on the salience of
issues and policy making. Besides, it may be ‘easier’ for Social Democrats to defend the
socio-economic dimension when they are not challenged by a successful extreme-right party.
One may indeed note that it has been ‘easier’ for the PS to keep the focus within the political
system on the economic dimension than for the SP, which has been confronted with a well-
organized and successful extreme-right party with a well-developed communication strategy.
Yet it has been argued that Social Democratic parties – as well as other (mainstream) parties
– need not be passive spectators and can attempt to minimize the impact of issues for which
they cannot convincingly claim ‘ownership’ (Petrocik 1996) or ‘present alternative frames of
how to understand social problems and ills’ (Rydgren 2004, p. 497). Also, the historical strength
of the PS in Wallonia makes the hypothesis of ‘reversed causality’ – that the PS would have
remained strong and therefore able to concentrate on its core (economic) issues because the
extreme right in Wallonia has been weak – unlikely. That is, the weakness of the extreme
right since its inception in 1987 cannot have caused the Social Democrats to be strong even
prior to the existence of the extreme right.
Before turning to our conclusion, it should be noted that in Flanders the media picked up
politicized issues such as criminality and migration. An analysis revealed that the attention
within the Dutch-speaking media on topics such as migration and criminality increased signiﬁ-
cantly during the 1990s (Walgrave and De Swert 2004). This attention obviously increases the
salience of these issues, which positively affects the extreme-right’s success. Furthermore, the






































and their charismatic and well-spoken leaders, giving the party the much-needed publicity and a
‘respectable’ image. Contrariwise, the French-speaking media have consequently neglected to
inform their audience about the extreme right (Coffe´ 2005b).
Conclusion
Our analysis of the different success of the extreme-right parties in the Flemish and Walloon
region has emphasized the importance of the role of the Social Democratic parties in explaining
the difference in level of success. The PS’s ability to keep material issues at the centre of the
political agenda and its close (clientelistic) contact with its electorate helped to keep the
extreme right from succeeding in Wallonia during the 1990s. Contrariwise, the de-pillarization
of Flemish society and economic growth have freed working-class voters from traditional parties
and turned their attention away from economic issues towards cultural ones, particularly immi-
gration, that redound to the extreme right. However, it is not only the strategy of the Social
Democratic parties that explains the success of the extreme right, as their strategy is also inﬂu-
enced by the strategies of the other mainstream parties. Besides, the extreme-right parties them-
selves also inﬂuence the salience of different policy issues and the mainstream parties’
strategies. The mainstream parties may indeed move rightwards in order not to push their
supporters towards the extreme right, as has been the case in Flanders where the mainstream
parties took stricter positions with regard to criminality and immigration.
We should also note that while we have rejected several alternative explanations for the
puzzle ‘Why Flanders and not Wallonia?’ there are other variables to consider. Hossay (2002,
p. 184) focuses on the (historical) presence of the Flemish nationalist movement ‘which pro-
vided ideational, programmatic, and organizational coherence for Flemish extremists’. The
long history of nationalist agitation in Flanders has indeed provided the VB with a reservoir
of party activists and leaders that have helped it to become one of the most professional and
best-organized extreme-right parties in Western Europe. The FN lacks such a tradition and sub-
culture upon which to build, and it has been organizationally weak from its inception. While we
do not believe that such an argument about historical continuities (or the lack thereof) challenges
the argument we have presented in this article, we do believe that arguments about historical
legacies and organizational capacities have received short shrift in the literature on the
extreme right (although Carter 2005 is an important exception), and that there is much to be
done in this area. Indeed, in contrast to the FN, the VB is an efﬁciently structured, well-organized
party with charismatic leaders. In terms of policies and campaigns, the FN does not represent
much at all. Apart from its virulent views on migration, it has little to say and lacks a real
programme. These supply-side elements obviously need more attention in future research on
the extreme-right party family.
Further research could also add more cases to our analysis, which is limited to a comparison
of two regions. Adding more countries or regions may help to conﬁrm the role of the Social
Democratic parties in the success of the extreme-right parties. To a greater extent than Christian
Democratic and Liberal parties, which are obviously closer to extreme-right parties in spatial
terms, Social Democrats have lost voters to extreme-right competitors. The ‘median’
extreme-right voter ﬁts the proﬁle of the old Social Democratic one very closely. It seems
clear to us that, as in the cases of Flanders and Wallonia, Social Democratic parties across
Western Europe have had varying success in holding onto their traditional base and the enduring
high salience of ‘their’ issues. In Sweden, enduring class loyalties (especially for working-class
voters) and the enduring high salience of the economic cleavage dimension have worked against
the emergence of a strong extreme-right party (Rydgren 2002). The degree of class voting is still






































left classiﬁcation mainly on the basis of the economic cleavage dimension. As in Wallonia, the
class voting behaviour of the working class as well as the salience of the economic cleavage may
thus explain the relative failure of Swedish extreme-right parties during the 1990s. In Germany,
the salience of economic issues has also been related to the lack of electoral success of extreme-
right parties (Kriesi et al. 2006). Comparing six West European countries, Kriesi et al. (2006)
show that over recent decades economic issues have lost in salience in all countries except
Germany, which conﬁrms their expectation that extreme-right parties will be electorally less
successful in countries where the traditional left–right divide is strong and where economic
issues are salient in the party system. The opposite of the German case is the Danish one,
where issues relating to the socio-economic dimension have lost salience and where the
extreme-right People’s Party has become successful by mobilizing working-class voters,
while the Social Democratic Party has lost its hegemonic position (Rydgren 2004).
Finally, considering a longer time period may provide additional insight into the role of the
Social Democrats with regard to the success of the extreme right. Party constituencies can change
with time, and other factors such as economic conditions also change with time. The ability of the
Social Democrats to adapt to or react to such changes can have an inﬂuence on their success. The
current research has focused mainly on the 1990s. Although we found that the endurance of
the PS in Wallonia helps us to explain the weakness of the FN, future research will have to
investigate whether this is still true today and will be in the future, as we ﬁnd a decreasing
level of party loyalty during the 1990s, as well as a growing convergence in political space.
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